key press, does or does not cause an outcome, such as a light flash, to occur (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979) . The outcome can be programmed by the experimenter to be contingent or noncontingent upon the participant's response. When asked to judge their degree of control over the outcome's occurrence, people generally tend to make judgements that are consistent with the relationship that they are asked to judge (Allan & Jenkins, 1980; Vallée-Tourangeau, Hollingsworth, & Murphy, 1998a; Wasserman et al., 1993) .
However, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found that people's mood might alter their perceptions of response -outcome contingencies. They asked nondepressed and depressed students to judge their degree of control over an outcome in two conditions that were both programmed to be noncontingent but differed in the frequency of outcome occurrence. According to Alloy and Abramson, accurate participants should have learnt that there was no relationship between their responses and the outcome in both conditions. They found, however, that when outcomes occurred frequently, nondepressed people seemed to think that they had more control over the outcome occurrence than when it occurred less frequently. Depressed participants, on the other hand, perceived that their behaviour had the same control over the occurrence of the outcome in both conditions. According to Alloy and Abramson the depressed participants did not show an illusion of control while the nondepressed did. On the basis of these findings, Alloy and Abramson suggested that depression increased accuracy in the perception of noncontingent relationships. Of course one simple explanation may have been that the nondepressed used the judgement scale in a different way to reflect frequency rather than contingency; however, other more complex explanations were proposed.
One theoretical account of this apparent tendency towards accuracy explains depressive judgements in terms of pessimistic but accurate expectations. In other words, if depressed people, who might expect to have little or no control over their environment, are presented with a situation congruent with these expectations, their judgements will appear to be accurate (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984 ). An alternative interpretation of the depressive realism literature, based on a psychophysical analysis of contingency data, questions whether verbal ratings actually assess sensitivity to the presented contingency (see Allan, Siegel, & Hannah, 2007) . However, whether any participant's judgement reflects absolute accuracy assumes that the experimenter is in a privileged position to objectively measure the contingency.
We have suggested that knowing the exact contingency to which a participant is exposed is extremely difficult (see Murphy, Vallée-Tourangeau, Msetfi, & Baker, 2005) . For instance, we have found that one particular experimental variable that might not normally be considered by the experimenter to be relevant to participants' judgements-the length of the intertrial interval (ITI)-has a particular influence on judgements (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005) . These findings are described in greater detail below but, briefly, we found that the so-called illusion of control with nondepressed is only present in conditions with long intervals between the experimental trials. The theoretical analysis of this effect, which we presented, suggested that the intertrial interval might be being integrated into the perception of contingency. Doing this might radically alter a participant's perception of the programmed contingency. For instance, conditions that are apparently noncontingent from the perspective of the experimenter might be correctly perceived as contingent by the participant. This difference is important for understanding depressive cognition. Indeed the notion of depressive realism (DR) depends upon the assumption that nondepressed people's judgements reflect inaccuracy. In order to illustrate how nondepressed people's apparently optimistic contingency estimates might actually be accurate, the discussion below describes contingency events and shows how the integration of ITIs changes the contingency calculation. Figure 1 (upper panel) shows how to categorize the four different types of experience that can be used to determine whether any event (in this case the response) and outcome are noncontingent (i.e., independent) or contingent (i.e., related).
The frequency of pairing the response with the outcome (cell A), or the frequency of the response without the outcome (cell B), together define how likely it is that the response will be followed by an outcome. Similarly, the frequency of the outcome by itself (cell C) or the frequency of neither the response nor the outcome (cell D) defines how likely the outcome is to occur in the absence of the response. One frequently used normative measure of the overall relationship, against which to evaluate the accuracy of judgements, is Dp (Allan, 1980) . Dp is simply the difference between the probability of the outcome given the response, P(OjR), and the probability of the outcome given no response, P(OjNoR). Dp varies continuously between þ1, indicating a perfect positive relationship, through zero, indicating no relationship, to 21, indicating a perfectly negative relationship. A positive value of Dp indicates that the response is related to an increase in the likelihood of the occurrence of the outcome, whereas a negative value of Dp indicates that the presence of the response decreases the likelihood of the outcome occurring. 
The middle panel shows high-density positive, zero, and negative contingencies and the Dp and causal power calculation for each condition. The lower panel shows the effect of adding 40 ITIs, as cell D events, to the Dp and causal power calculations. Note that P(OjR) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the presence of the response, and P(OjNoR) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the absence of the response.
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 60 (3) If judgements are based on a cognitive process that mirrors this relationship, as some have proposed (Cheng, 1997) , then one might conclude that judgements were accurate. However, the finding that judgements sometimes deviate from this, or other normative measures, has controversially been used to support the idea that people are not accurate (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Smedslund, 1963) .
The problem for any claim of an assessment of accuracy is that it assumes that the experimenter can easily identify all the event information that the participant will recruit for their judgement. During a discrete trial training procedure, participants experience trials during which they are encouraged to either perform a response (cells A and B) or withhold responding (cells C and D), thereby providing them with the only relevant data with which to form their judgements. The intertrial intervals in these tasks are simply empty periods during which the participants wait for the next opportunity to learn. However, the intertrial interval, like all experience, could be considered as one of the four relevant event conjunctions that represent the information relevant for judging response-outcome contingency (cell D: See also Baker, Murphy, Vallée-Tourangeau, & Mehta, 2001) .
In previous work we showed that the length of the ITI does influence participants' perceptions of contingency Murphy et al., 2005) . Both nondepressed and depressed participants were exposed to the zero-contingency condition, shown in Figure 1 , with either short (3-s) or long (15-s) intertrial intervals. Nondepressed people's judgements were significantly more positive in the long than in the short intertrial interval conditions. Moreover, like Alloy and Abramson (1979) this effect was present in high outcome frequency (see Figure 1 : Dp ¼ .75 2.75 ¼ 0) but not low outcome frequency zero contingencies (Dp ¼ .25 2.25 ¼ 0). This is exactly the result that one might predict if the intertrial intervals were being perceived as evidence-that when participants do not perform the response, no outcome occurs (cell D event). It follows that if ITIs are included in a contingency calculation as cell D events, then a zero contingency relationship, which might be programmed during the discrete trials by the experimenter, might actually be perceived as a positive contingency by the participant. Figure 1 (middle column, middle panel) shows the traditional calculation of Dp for a 40-trial zero contingency. A 40-trial procedure also includes 40 ITI periods and the impact of including 40 ITIs into the contingency calculation as cell D events is also displayed (middle column, lower panel) and results in an increase in Dp. This increase occurs because in each case extra cell D events only influence one of the two conditional probabilities that describe Dp. They decrease P(OjNoR), while having no impact on the P(OjR), and furthermore this influence should be less dramatic in a low outcome frequency zero contingency. The inclusion of 40 ITIs as cell D events is, of course, purely arbitrary as it is unknown whether one ITI is perceived as more than or less than one cell D event. However, any additional cell D events included in the contingency calculation will have the effect of reducing the P(OjNoR) in the manner described above.
There are at least two possible reasons why nondepressed people's judgements of a zero contingency increased with longer intertrial intervals. The first is related to potential changes to the predictive value of the absence of responding. Lengthening the ITI may increase the perception that, in the absence of any responding, the other experimental cues (the context) fail to elicit the outcome, in spite of the fact that participants have no opportunity to respond during the ITI. The second source of the effect may lie with the difference in the session lengths between short and long ITI conditions. It is possible that the change in judgements reflects greater confidence that might emerge with the longer training following longer ITIs or perhaps some effect due to general habituation to the experimental setting.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the first experiment reported here, to rule out an explanation of the effect based on simple exposure, we manipulated both the ITI length and session length to test which of the two factors results in the increased judgements of zero contingencies. The design involved crossing two levels of ITI length (3 s, 15 s) with two levels of training length (320 s, 800 s), which consequently required varying the number of trials experienced by the four groups. If ITI length is the crucial variable, then both groups of control participants trained with the long ITI should show higher judgements of the zero contingencies, regardless of session length or number of trials. Depressed participants should show no sensitivity to the change in ITI length, and their judgements might be expected to be generally lower than nondepressed participants' judgements.
However, a further variable, which might potentially contribute to the effects we are discussing, is the number of responses that participants perform during the procedure. For example, consider the case of a zero-contingency condition, where the P(OjR) and P(OjNoR) are programmed to be .75. If the participant did not evenly distribute responding, then it is possible that the programmed contingency might drift from the nominal value programmed. In the extreme case, if the participant responded on every trial then they would have no information about withholding responses, and this might lead them to experience a positive contingency with the P(OjR) . P(OjNoR) and consequently higher judgements. Indeed, Matute (1996) showed how higher rates of responding were linked to higher judgements, although this tendency was observed only in conditions where participants were not explicitly instructed to sample response and no-response trials equally. Given that such fluctuations in P(R) could produce long ITI depressive realism effects, in the present experiments we report the P(R) in order to examine this possibility.
Method
Participants University students received course credit for their participation and were assigned to the nondepressed (n ¼ 36) and depressed groups (n ¼ 39) on the basis of their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961 
Design
In this experiment, we used a 2 (ITI length: short, 3 s; long, 15 s) Â 2 (overall procedure time: short, 320 s; long, 800 s) Â 2 (mood: nondepressed, depressed) fully factorial between-subjects design. Unlike our previous experiments in which all treatments received the same number (40) of trials, in this experiment the number of trials was a function of the combination of ITI length and procedure time. The short ITI length and short procedure time group received 40 trials as before, but the short ITI length group with the long procedure received 100 trials. In the two , 2007, 60 (3) long ITI treatments, the number of trials was 16 and 40 for the short and long procedure times, respectively. A computerized version of the contingency judgement task used by Alloy and Abramson (1979) was used to obtain judgements of control (for full details, see Msetfi et al., 2005) . The task was a high-density zero-contingency condition (shown in Figure 1 ), where the P(lightjresponse) was .75, and the P(lightjno response) was also .75. This contingency was chosen as it is the one in which both Alloy and Abramson and Msetfi et al. found reliable differences between the depressed and control groups. The total numbers of trials, cell frequencies, and Dp for each experimental condition are shown in Table 1 . Participants judged their control over light onset on a scale that varied from 0 to 100, where 0 ¼ no control and 100 ¼ total control. Intermediate values represented varying degrees of partial control.
Apparatus
The presentation of experimental events was programmed using REALbasic (Version 3) software.
Procedure
Participants were briefed verbally and in writing as to the nature of the task requirements and then completed the BDI. Task instructions, displayed on the computer screen, explained how participants were to judge how much control their pressing of a button had over a light switching on and informed them about the necessity of pressing the button on some trials but not on others on an approximately equal number of occasions (see Appendix A). At the beginning of the session, a light bulb graphic in its "off state" appeared on the screen. Each trial was constructed so that there was a 3-s opportunity for the participant to press the button using the space bar on the computer keyboard. This period was signalled by an onscreen message saying, "You may press the button now!" This was followed by a 2-s period, on both response and no response trials, where the light bulb graphic either switched to the "on state" or remained in the "off state". Each trial was separated by an ITI period (3 s or 15 s) where the light bulb graphic in its "off state" remained on the screen. The probability of the light switching on both after a response and after no response was .75. Judgements of control were made after all experimental trials were completed. Participants were then debriefed.
Results and discussion
Judgements of perceived control over light onset in the high-density zero-contingency condition with short and long ITIs and short and long procedure times are shown in Figure 2 . The data suggest that, whereas the nondepressed groups' judgements increased with the longer ITI, this effect was not influenced by the overall procedure time.
Depressed participants' judgements, in contrast, were not influenced by either factor. The data were analysed using a fully factorial analysis of variance, with ITI length (3 s, 15 s), overall procedure time (320 s, 800 s), and mood (nondepressed, depressed) as between-subjects Response rates. The rate of responding for each participant was converted to a probability of response and was analysed using the same procedure as that described above. The mean probability of response for each experimental condition is shown in Table 2 .
The analysis showed that the probability of responding was generally higher for nondepressed Taken together, these findings suggest that the increased judgements observed with longer ITIs are not a function of the increased session length. It is also quite interesting that when ITI length was constant but trials were manipulated (in order to increase procedure time), there was no effect of the number of trials. Previous studies have reported trial effects on contingency judgements (Dickinson et al., 1984; Shanks, 1985) , although these effects have been observed using a continuous monitoring procedure (see Baker, Berbrier, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 1989 , for a more detailed discussion of why these effects may have occurred).
Even though both mood and overall procedure time were shown to influence the P(R), the observed differences were not large enough to produce fluctuations in the programmed contingency. Moreover, ITI length alone, or in interaction with mood, did not produce differences in the P(R). This result then, is consistent with the conclusion that with long ITIs, nondepressed participants perceive a stronger relation between responding and the occurrence of the outcome.
EXPERIMENT 2
So far we have only studied the effect of ITIs on putative zero contingency learning. The reason for this is that previous studies had suggested that nonzero contingencies do not elicit differences between depressed and nondepressed participants (Alloy, Abramson, & Kossman, 1985; Lennox, Bedell, Abramson, Raps, & Foley, 1990; Vasquez, 1987) . Alloy and Abramson suggested that nonzero contingencies might match the expectations that drive judgements in nondepressed participants, whereas zero contingencies do not. This is because, in zero-contingency conditions, nondepressed people's judgements reflect an optimistic bias because they are more likely to expect to have control over outcomes than they actually do (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) . In contrast depressed people have unbiased expectations regardless of , 2007, 60 (3) contingency. Consistent with this prediction there is no evidence, so far, that depressive realism effects occur in nonzero-contingency conditions. However, the possible role of the ITI that we have described can also inform the issue of whether nonzero contingencies might produce mood differences. Positive contingencies are in fact predicted to be less susceptible to ITI effects than are zero contingencies. Furthermore the ITI analysis suggests that the effects might be as strong or stronger with negative contingencies. According to our analysis, ITIs influence the overall contingency because, if conceptualized as extra cell D events, they reduce the probability of the outcome in the absence of the response, P(OjNoR). However, the effect is predicted to be determined by the specific level of contingency. Consider the high-density zero contingency displayed in Figure 1 . If 40 ITIs are included as extra cell D events, the P(OjNoR) decreases from .75 to .25, with a corresponding increase in Dp from 0 to .5. However, in a positive-contingency condition (Figure 1 , left column), where the P(O/R) is 1.0, and the P(OjNoR) is .5, the P(OjNoR) decreases from .5 to .17, with the potential increase in Dp being from .5 to .83. Therefore, with the same change in cell D, the increase to the overall relationship is smaller for positive contingencies. In contrast, a negativecontingency condition, where the Dp is -.5 (Figure 1 , right column) the change in contingency is greatest, with the contingency going from -.5 to .17. Therefore, changes to P(OjNoR) might be expected to influence negative contingencies more than zero and zero more than positive contingencies. Therefore, what have hitherto been referred to as depressive realism effects, but in our terms the tendency for nondepressed participants to produce judgements that varied from the normative expectations of the experimenter, might be more readily observable in negative and zero contingencies than in positive-contingency conditions. This might explain previous failures to find them in positive contingencies. It is worth noting that this general pattern of changes requires choosing contingencies that are matched on overall number of trials.
The prediction stated above is shared by most theories of contingency learning although for different reasons. The Power PC model (Cheng, 1997) , for example, assumes that judgements are based on the intuitive notion of causal power. Generative causal power can be calculated by dividing DP by the denominator: 1 -P(OjNoR) or in the case of preventative power simply by P(OjNoR). Therefore any reduction in the P(OjNoR), because of the inclusion of extra ITI or D cell events, would result in an increase in both the numerator and the denominator of the equation, as well as the resulting causal power. As in the analysis presented above, the ITI is likely to have less effect on causal power in conditions where the Dp is already positive (see Figure 1 ).
The associative Rescorla -Wagner model (RWM: Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) makes similar predictions to Dp although for different reasons. In associative language, two associations, the response-outcome association and the context -outcome association, compete for associative strength. The strength of the responseoutcome association increases to the extent that the context -outcome association decreases or extinguishes. One interpretation of the increased judgements found with extra intertrial interval experience is that the ITI serves to extinguish the association between the contextual cues and the outcome. However, the difference between the two ITI conditions (short and long) for positive contingencies is predicted to be smaller than that for zero contingencies. Like the Dp and Power PC models, this ITI effect would be predicted to be less apparent in positive contingencies. The aim of the next two experiments was to extend the ITI analysis to conditions with nonzero levels of contingency.
We made two changes to the previous procedure. One involved an attempt to measure the contextual learning that might be taking place during this task, and the other involved shortening the length of the ITI in the short ITI conditions. Previous studies of human contextual learning (e.g., Vallée-Tourangeau, Murphy, Drew, & Baker, 1998b) and animal contextual conditioning (Murphy & Baker, 2004) , which have measured contextual learning using a discrete constantly present cue to represent the context, have found evidence of the reciprocal learning between discrete cues and contextual cues. Furthermore, there is direct evidence that increasing the intervals between trials improves learning about the target stimulus (or response) relative to massing trials, in both animals (Gibbon, Baldock, Locurto, Gold, & Terrace, 1977; Holland, 2000) and humans (Mercier & Parr, 1996) . The following experiment included a constantly present cue, and we asked participants to judge the constant cues. However, in order not to contaminate the target cue ratings, context judgements were always taken following judgements of the target.
In order to maximize the difference between the short and long ITI conditions the length of the short ITI in these experiments was reduced from 3 to 0.5 seconds. A shorter ITI should be expected to decrease contextual extinction and therefore the context's impact on judgements, which might then be predicted to strengthen the contrast between the short and long ITI conditions.
Method
Participants A total of 96 university students were recruited for this experiment using a mass screening procedure and were paid £5 for their participation. They were required to fill in the BDI before being invited to participate in the experiment. On arrival, participants filled in the BDI again and were assigned to the depressed and nondepressed groups as described previously with the constraint that there should be equal numbers of males and females in each group. Experimental conditions (n ¼ 12) were matched on age and years of education, F (1, 88) 
Design
The experiment utilized a 2 (contingency: zero, positive) Â 2 (length of intertrial interval: short, long) Â 2 (mood: nondepressed, depressed) Â 2 (sex: female, male) fully factorial between-subjects design. Participants were exposed to either a highdensity zero (.75/.75) or positive (1.0/.5) contingency condition. The ITI was either short (0.5 s) or long (15 s), and participants were either depressed or nondepressed. Participants made judgements about their own control over the outcome when making the response. They also made similar judgements about a constantly present context cue, an on-screen button that remained in the "on" position throughout the experimental task.
Data analysis. The data were analysed using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with ITI length (short, long), contingency (zero, positive), mood (nondepressed, depressed), and sex (female, male) as between-subjects factors with judgements of the response and the context treated as two dependent variables. The MANOVA analysis allows one to determine whether the four factors influence ratings of the response cue and the context cue in the same manner and whether judgements of zero and positive contingencies differ. As sex had no reliable effects on judgements this factor was excluded from further analyses. Probability of response data was also analysed using a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) including the same factors as those described above.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that for Experiment 1 except that there was a variation in task instructions in order to accommodate the introduction of the new context button. Participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which they were scientists testing a piece of experimental apparatus (see Appendix B) . Participants were shown a picture of the apparatus, which comprised a small box containing a visible light bulb. Mounted on the apparatus were two buttons-"A" and "B". Button B (the constantly present context) was stuck in the "on" position and could not be pressed. Button A was the only button that participants could press, using the space bar on the keyboard, to assess the extent of their control over light onset. Participants were informed that they would make two judgements, the first about their own control over light onset when pressing Button A and the second about Button B's control over light onset. There was a 3-s button-pressing opportunity signalled by an onscreen message, "You may press the button now!" This was followed by a 2-s period when the light either switched on or remained off. Each trial was separated by an intertrial interval that was 0.5 s long in the short conditions and 15 s long in the long conditions. After completing the 40 experimental trials, participants made their judgements.
Results and discussion
Judgements were made about control over light onset in zero-and positive-contingency conditions with short and long ITIs and are shown in Figure 3 . Response judgements appeared to be influenced by contingency and ITI length, whereas context judgements were not.
These observations were examined using an MANOVA. There were no reliable main effects or interactions involving the context judgements. Overall the level of contingency influenced response judgements, with positive contingencies judged to be higher than zero contingencies Although the three-way interaction between contingency, mood, and ITI length was not reliable, it was necessary to conduct further comparisons involving the contingency factor in order to assess hypotheses about ITI effects being dependent on levels of contingency. Therefore, seven further comparisons were then carried out on the response data with the alpha level adjusted to a conservative value of .007 using the Bonferroni procedure.
There was no evidence that nondepressed people's judgements increased as a function of ITI length in the positive-contingency condition, F , 1. Although depressed people's judgements of the same condition appeared to be lower in the long ITI condition, this difference was not significant at the adjusted alpha level, F (1, 88) level of significance, F(1, 88) ¼ 3.51, p , .06, h 2 ¼ .001, MSE ¼ 689.16. It is also worth noting that an effect size calculated for this comparison using the standardized difference between the means (Hedges's g) was 0.79, which is generally considered to be a large effect size. Given this and that we have found this result several times, there is some confidence in accepting this result.
Response rates. The likelihood of participants eliciting a response for all experimental conditions is shown in Table 3 .
An analysis of these scores showed that the only factor to affect the P(R) was contingency, with zero contingencies generally producing a higher probability of response (
. None of the other main effects or interactions were reliable (all ps . .11, all h 2 , .03). The results of the present experiment provide support for the hypothesis that ITI effects would be less evident in positive-contingency conditions, although there was no evidence that the context cue elicited differential judgements. Consistent with predictions of the PPC model, the specific positive-contingency condition used in this experiment produced no evidence of increases in nondepressed people's judgements with long ITI conditions. The data did suggest, however, that depressive realism effects were present in long ITI conditions at both zero and positive levels of contingency. It is also worth pointing out that the depressed people's judgements actually seemed to decrease with longer ITIs. A nonreliable trend for this difference was also reported by Msetfi et al. (2005) . This result suggests that depression may be consistent with a decrease in judgements with long ITIs. This finding and its implications are discussed further in the General Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiment 2 were consistent with the RWM and Power PC model predictions for a weaker effect in positive contingencies. No reliable difference was found for the nondepressed group between long and short ITI conditions. Of course this inference requires acceptance of the null hypothesis, although in the same experiment the ITI effect was found with zero contingencies. Recall, however, that both models predict that ITI effects should be evident in negative contingencies. We test for evidence of the ITI effect with a negative-contingency condition in Experiment 3. Some previous depressive realism studies have examined judgements of negative contingencies and found no mood differences (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Kapci & Cramer, 1999; Lennox et al., 1990) . However, these studies all used unidirectional 0 to 100 scales. That is, both positive and negative relationships were to be translated to a positive scale. This type of scale includes both the negative ("I prevent the outcome.") and positive ("I produce the outcome.") aspects in the "to what extent do I control the occurrence of the outcome" judgements. So nonzero judgements would indicate some degree of control whether positive or negative. The use of this scale mitigated against finding mood contingency interactions. The following experiment used a bidirectional scale in order to allow negative judgements.
Method
Participants A total of 48 university students were recruited for this experiment using the same mass screening 
Design
The experiment was a fully factorial 2 (mood: depressed, nondepressed) Â 2 (ITI length: short, 0.5 s, long, 15 s) Â 2 (sex: male, female) fully factorial between-subjects design. The same judgement task as that used in Experiment 2 was employed in the present experiment. In this task, the contingency between the response (pressing Button A) and the outcome (light onset) was programmed to be negative. The P(OjR) was .5, and the P(OjNoR) was 1.0, and therefore the programmed Dp in all conditions was a high outcome density, moderately negative contingency (See Figure 1, right column) . The contingency judgements reported in the previous experiments were all made using a unidirectional, 0 to 100 judgement scale (where 0 represented "no control", and 100 indicated "total control"). A bidirectional scale, ranging from 2 100 (total preventative control) through 0 (no control) to þ 100 (total causative control), was used in this experiment. The change in judgement scale also required a change in the instructions to introduce the idea that pressing the button might prevent light onset from occurring.
Data analysis. The data were analysed using a similar procedure as that described in the previous experiment. None of the main effects or interactions involving sex approached the level of significance (all ps . .2, all h 2 , .08), so this factor was removed from the model. It might be considered desirable to enter any nonmatched variable into the analysis as a covariate, although see Miller and Chapman (2001) for an opposing view. However, 1 participant did not complete the digit span test, and including digit span as a covariate would have entailed excluding this participant's data from the analysis. All analyses were conducted both including and excluding the covariate. Digit span had no significant effects on judgements (F , 1) , and excluding the covariate made no difference to the subsequently reported effects. In order to preserve the equal numbers of participants in each experimental group (n ¼ 12), digit span was not included in the reported data analysis.
Procedure
The instructions only differed from those used in Experiment 2 in that they included reference to the possibility that the response could actually prevent the occurrence of the outcome (see Appendix C).
Results and discussion
The judgements of response and context from Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 4 . It seems that, as with Experiment 2, the experimental manipulation did not influence judgements of the context cue but appeared to have a strong interactive effect on the response judgements.
The data were analysed using an MANOVA, where mood (depressed, nondepressed) and ITI length (short, long) were between-subjects factors, and judgements of the response and the discrete context were the two dependent variables. There were no reliable main effects or interactions involving the context cue (Fs , 1) .
However, for the response cue, the interaction between mood and ITI length suggested that the mood groups responded differently to the ITI manipulation, F(1, 44) Response rates. The probabilities of response for each experimental condition are shown in Table 4 . The analysis showed that none of the main effects or interactions approached the level of significance (all ps . .22, all h 2 , .03).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three experiments, the relationship between mood, ITI length, and the strength of contingency judgements was examined. The findings support the idea that nondepressed peoples' judgements are influenced by ITI in a manner consistent with contingency theory, but that depressed people's judgements are not. The implications of these findings for models of contingency learning and for depressive realism are discussed in turn.
Contingency learning
The results of our previous work on depressive realism Murphy et al., 2005) suggested that longer periods of intertrial interval during learning increase contingency estimates of high-density zero contingencies but did not exclude the possibility that this effect was due to the increase in overall procedure time that accompanies the longer ITI conditions. However, Experiment 1 showed that judgements increased with longer ITIs specifically but did not increase with longer procedure times. The results of all three experiments also support the general prediction that the ITI effects found with nondepressed participants depended upon the specific contingency tested rather than the distinction between zero and nonzero contingencies made by Alloy and Abramson (1979) . As further evidence, the order of effect sizes is consistent with the idea that the effect might be strongest with the negative contingencies we tested and gradually weaker with the zero and positive contingencies. Effect sizes (ES) for each relevant comparison, with nondepressed participants, were calculated using Hedges's g (Hedges, 1982) , an unbiased estimator of Cohen's d (Cohen, 1977) , which is scale THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 60 (3) independent.
1 The ITI effect produced a large ES in negative-contingency conditions (Experiment 3: g ¼ 1.22), a medium to large effect in zero contingencies (Experiment 1: g ¼ 0.84; Experiment 2: g ¼ 0.79) and no perceptible effect when the contingency was positive (Experiment 2: g ¼ 0.09).
One associative model that has been applied to human contingency learning, the RescorlaWagner model, also predicts this ordinal pattern when ITIs are included as nonreinforced context experience. It should be noted that this prediction was based on the particular set of contingencies that we tested and is partially determined by the exact set of cell frequencies. Figure 5 shows that for any contingency, the increase in Dp, due to increased frequency of cell D events, is positively correlated with the frequency of outcomes. It was for this reason that we argued previously that the inclusion of ITIs into contingency judgements might be also responsible for outcome density effects and showed that outcome density effects were only present in long-ITI conditions (Experiment 2: Msetfi et al., 2005) . However, if outcome frequency is held constant, whether low, medium, or high, the ordinal pattern of ITI effects should hold. However, it is unlikely that low outcome frequency conditions would produce perceptible ITI effects in any contingency given that the maximum difference in Dp is predicted to be small.
We also sought to examine whether judgements of a constantly present cue, intended to represent the context, would be influenced by the change in the ITI. During long ITI periods in the absence of the outcome, the context might be predicted to extinguish (i.e., lose association with the outcome). However, contextual learning, as measured by judgements of the button that was always on, was not influenced by any of the experimental manipulations, including contingency and ITI length. This could be taken to indicate that ITI effects do not occur due to context extinction as some associative models suggest (e.g., RWM). Alternatively, a more cautious conclusion given other evidence that judgements of a constantly present cue do change as a function of contingency (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 1998b) , might be that the constantly present cue, used in these experiments, was ineffective. The context button may have simply been disregarded. Alternatively, the context judgements may have been contaminated by the target judgements. The lack of counterbalancing during the collection of judgements leaves this a possibility.
The Power PC model of causal judgements (Cheng, 1997) also predicts the pattern of ITI effects that we have observed, if longer ITIs increase the frequency of cell D events, as seems to be the case. Figure 1 shows how extra cell D events differentially influence power in negative, zero, and positive contingencies. Although ITIs might be predicted to influence causal power to a greater extent in negative than in positive contingencies, no effect was predicted in the specific positive-contingency condition that we tested, where the P(OjR) was 1.0, and the P(OjNoR) was .5. This is because generative causal power is: Dp/[1 -P(OjNoR)], which is: .5/ (1 -.5) ¼ 1. In this condition, Dp is also calculated by subtracting the P(OjNoR) from 1.0, which is: 1 -.5 ¼ .5. Therefore the numerator and the denominator of the generative power would always be identical, (1 -.5)/(1 -.5) ¼ 1, no matter how the P(OjNoR) changes. Therefore the pattern of ITI effects observed here are entirely consistent with the Power PC model.
Depressive realism
Depressed people have previously been considered to be more "realistic" in their judgements of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 60 (3) 475 DEPRESSIVE REALISM contingency (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) . Furthermore depressive realism effects were only thought to occur in zero contingencies (Alloy et al., 1985; Lennox et al., 1990; Vasquez, 1987) , due to depressed people's negative but accurate expectations. We found that depressed people made lower judgements than did nondepressed people in all contingencies tested, but only when ITIs were long. This did not seem to be indicative of a general tendency towards accuracy on the part of depressed people. Irrespective of ITI length, there was little difference between depressed people's judgements of zero and positive contingencies.
We have also suggested that if nondepressed people include long periods of context exposure occurring during the ITI into their judgements, then perhaps depressed people process these time periods differently and maybe do not include ITIs in their judgements. The current results support the softer claim since there is some evidence that ITI length does influence depressed people's judgements. We previously found that when a short ITI was of a relatively standard 3-s duration, and the long ITI was of a 15-s duration, there was no evidence of an ITI effect (e.g., Msetfi et al., 2005 , Exp. 1; Experiment 1 here). However, when the short ITI was of a .5-s duration, as in Experiments 2 and 3 reported here, there was some evidence of a reduction on judgements with longer ITIs (see Figure 3) . In fact, in the negative contingency (DP ¼ 2.5), depressed people's judgements with the short .5-s ITI were high and close to zero. This is more consistent with the suggestion that depressed people process ITIs differently, but it would not be true to say that their judgements are not influenced by ITI length. In fact the pattern of findings seems to suggest that the effect of the ITI in depressed people is exactly in opposition to the same effect in nondepressed people. Longer intertrial intervals increase judgements of zero and negative contingencies in nondepressed people but have the opposite effect in depressed people.
The study of zero and positive contingencies has always been seen as particularly relevant for depression. In this study we also tested for depressive realism effects in negative contingencies, which might also have some particular relevance to depression, because these are conditions in which actions reduce the likelihood of an outcome. The statement, "When I am around, nothing good ever happens", is a statement typical of a depressed person and an instance in which a person believes that their behaviour or presence reduces the likelihood of outcomes. This type of statement implies that depressed people often feel, to some degree, responsible for the nonoccurrence of positive outcomes. However, the latter situation is essentially a perceived negative contingency. Along these lines, in the negative contingency experiment reported here, the ability to control light onset, in the fictional situation of needing to use experimental equipment, might have been seen as a desirable state of affairs or a positive outcome. When there was information available that might have disconfirmed the presence of a preventative relationship (the long ITI or cell D), depressed people were strongly convinced that they were preventing the outcome from occurring. In the field of clinical psychology, this type of negativity is often taken as evidence for the existence of negative depressive schema postulated by cognitive theories of depression (e.g., Beck, 1967) . Such schema are negative fundamental beliefs about the self, including themes of helplessness and inefficacy, and bias the selection, coding, storage, and retrieval of incoming information (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999) . However, the present results suggest that a depressive tendency to underestimate the frequency of events that essentially disconfirm the presence of a preventative relationship between response and outcome (or confirm the presence of a positive relationship) could explain continued depressive negativity in some situations without recourse to schema-based theory (e.g., Beck, 1967) , as is traditionally the case.
In summary, this research has illustrated the difficulty in drawing conclusions about the relative accuracy of contingency judgements on the basis of procedures involving normative measures such as Dp. Nondepressed people's judgements change systematically with ITI length in a manner consistent with these time periods being included into the contingency calculation as cell D events. Given that their judgements could be considered to be more consistent with causal power calculated using the "overall Dp" as opposed to the "within trial" programmed Dp, nondepressed people were accurate. However, there was no evidence that the depressed were more accurate in their judgements, as there was little evidence of the ability to discriminate between two different levels of contingency. Thus perhaps depressive realism effects might be more accurately described as mood effects on learning.
APPENDIX A
Instructions and question wording for the contingency tasks used in Experiment 1
Screen 1
Imagine the following scenario.
You are a scientist and you are setting up the apparatus for your latest experiment. The apparatus includes a light bulb wired up to a light switch button and has its own power supply.
It is very important for your experiment that you the scientist feel that you can control when the light is switched on or remains off. You are working on a tight budget and had to use an old power supply provided by another researcher. You are slightly worried that the power supply you've had to use may not be suitable for this purpose.
Therefore you want to test the apparatus to assess how much control you have over the light switching on.
Screen 2
At the beginning of the test you will see a light bulb on the screen. There will be a short delay and then the button will appear on the screen too. While the button is on the screen you will be able to press it and see whether the light switches on or remains off. You can press the light button using the space bar on the computer keyboard. If the light switches on, it will stay on for 2 seconds before switching off.
The button will then disappear from the screen and will re-appear again when you can press the button again. In the test there will be many opportunities to press the button and see what happens.
Screen 3
In order to judge how much control your button pressing has over whether the light comes on, you need to know what happens when you press the button. IT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT that you know what happens when you do not press the button.
So, on about half of the button pressing opportunities, you should sit back and see what happens when you don't press the button.
Screen 4
(Graphic shows light bulb) If you press the button below, you will see an example of the light coming on. When you have done that, press the carry on button to proceed.
Screen 5
At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement about how much control your pressing the button had over whether the light came on.
"Total control" means that the light switching on is completely determined by your choice of response-either pressing or not pressing the button.
"No control" means that you have found that your button pressing has no influence at all on whether the light is switched on or not. In other words the light switching on has nothing to do with what you did or didn't do.
"Partial control" means that your pressing or not pressing the button, does influence the light switching on, but not completely. In other words, whether you press or don't press the button matters to some extent, but not totally.
Judgement screen
We would now like you to make a judgement about how much control your pressing the button had over whether the light came on. We will ask you to make this judgement by moving the slider.
If you consider that your button press has total control over the light coming on, you would move the slider to the "total control" end.
If you consider that your button press has absolutely no control over light coming on, you would move the slider to the "no control" end.
It may be that you consider that your button pressing has only partial control over the light coming on, then you would move the slider's position accordingly. Putting it nearer to the "total control" end means MORE control-while putting it nearer to the "no control" end means LESS control.
APPENDIX B
Instructions and question wording used for the contingency task used in Experiment 2
Screen 1
Please imagine the following scenario.
You are a scientist and you are investigating some old equipment in the store cupboard in the lab. You find a piece of apparatus called a PERCEPTOMETER. It resembles a large box with a light bulb attached to it. The box has 2 switches on it-"button A" and "button B" which you assume controls the light switching on, but you are not sure exactly how it works.
You think that the PERCEPTOMETER might be useful for your latest experiment. However because of the nature of your experiment, you need to be sure that you can control when the light switches on quite precisely. If the PERCEPTOMETER is slightly unreliable, it will ruin your experiment! Click here to see a picture of the PERCEPTOMETER.
Screen 2
Therefore you must test the PERCEPTOMETER to decide, "How much CONTROL DO YOU HAVE over the light switching on." It is possible that you may not have TOTAL control or ZERO control over the light switching on, but some intermediate level of control-slightly more or slightly less.
There is one problem however. "Button B" is ALWAYS stuck in the "ON" position. So you can only test how much control you have over the light switching on, by pressing "Button A".
Test your control over the light switching on by pressing "Button A". PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 60 (3) Button B Judgement Screen Remember, "Button B" was always on during the test.
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"Button B" might have more, less or the same control over the light switching on, than your pressing of "Button A". How much control do you think that "Button B" had over the light coming on?
Give your judgement on the slider below.
APPENDIX C Changes to the instructions in Experiment 3
Screen 5 At the end of the test, you will be asked to make a judgement-using a slider like this-about how much control your pressing of "Button A" had over whether the light came on or not. "Total causal control" means that your pressing of "Button A" caused the light to switch on.
"No control" means that you have found that your pressing of "Button A" pressing has no influence at all on whether the light switched on or not.
"Total preventive control" means that your pressing of "Button A", seems to prevent the light from switching on. Or you could move the slider to somewhere in between, because you might think that your pressing of "button A" causes the light to switch on to some degree, but not totally; or that your pressing of "button A" prevents the light from switching on, but not totally.
You will also be asked to make a judgement about how much control "Button B" alone-not you-had over the light switching on. If you are ready, please tell the experimenter.
NB: The questions asked in Experiment 3 were similar to those shown in Appendix C but used the bidirectional rating scale.
